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Summary findings
The government's  ability to credibly commit to policy  The presence of an independent central bank should
announcements  is critical to the successful  reduce inflation only in the presence of political checks
implementation  of economic policies as diverse as eapital  and balances. This effect should be evident in both
taxation  and utilities regulation. One frequently  developing and industrial countries.
advocated means of signaling credible commitmenm  is to  *  Political actions to interfere with the central bank
delegate authority to an agency that will not have an  should be more apparent when there are few checks and
incentive to opportunistically change policies once the  balances.
private sector has taken such steps as signing wage  *  The effects of checks and balances should be more
contracts or making irreversible investments.  marked when political decisionmakers are more
Delegating authority is suggested as a government  polarized.
strategy particularly for monetary policy. And existing  The authors test these predictions and find extensive
work on the independence of central banks generally  empirical evidence to support each of the observable
assumes that government decisions to delegate are  implications of their model: Central banks are associated
irrevocable. But delegation - in monetary policy as  with better inflation outcomes in the presence of checks
elsewhere - is inevitably a political choice, and can be  and balances. The turnover of central bank governors is
reversed, contend Keefer and Stasavage.  reduced when governors have tenure protections
They develop a model of monetary policy that relaxes  supported by political checks and balances. And the
the assumption that monetary delegation is irreversible.  effect of checks and balances is enhanced in more
Among the testable predictions of the model are these:  polarized political environments.
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The delegation  of decision  making  by political  actors to independent  agencies  has
been  the subject  of great debate  and analysis  in both political  science  and economics  (see,  for
example,  Epstein  and O'Halloran (1999),  Laffont  and Tirole (1990),  and McCubbins,  Noll
and Weingast  (1987).  One question continues  to be key to this debate: to what extent does
delegation  to an independent  agency  (or judiciary)  lead  to policy outcomes  different  than
those that political  actors  would otherwise  have  adopted? This paper is concerned  with one
important variant of this question,  the extent to which delegation  makes  policy
announcements  more credible  to private actors  than policy announcements  made in the
absence  of delegation. That is, are private actors more likely  to make fixed investments  or
subscribe  to long term contracts  when policy making has been delegated  to an independent
agency?
Although the answer  to this question  has implications  for economic  policy in areas
ranging  from capital  taxation and utilities regulation  to antitrust regulation,  a natural arena
to investigate  it is monetary policy. The literature has built up a large  body of knowledge
that suggests  a potentially  important role for independent  central banks. However,  these
results are generally  obtained  under the assumption  that delegation  of policy making  is
irrevocable: if delegation  is irrevocable  and agency  personnel  gain  nothing from reneging  on
policy  announcements,  private actors are likely  to find policies  under delegation  to be more
credible. However, delegation  is inevitably  a political  choice  which in practice  can be
reversed. In this paper we therefore  examine  policy  making with and without delegation,
relaxing  the assumption  that delegation  is irreversible.We compare  the credibility  of monetary policy  under three institutional
arrangements: government  with a single  decision  maker,  with checks  and balances,  and with
checks  and balances  and delegation  to an independent  central  bank. Within these
arrangements,  we consider  additional  variants  related  to the assignment  of agenda  control
and the extent of political  polarization.
In the second  half of the paper, we offer detailed  empirical  tests that strongly  support
the model's predictions. These tests use new data both on political  institutions and on
political  polarization and show  for the first time that, controlling  for political  institutions,
legal  central  bank independence  can reduce  inflation in both developing  and developed
countries,  and that this effect  depends  on the extent to which political decision  makers  are
polarized.
2.  A review of solutions to the credibility problem
The time consistency  problem in monetary policy,  identified  by Kydland  and
Prescott (1977)  and Barro and Gordon (1983a),  is well-known: a government  represented  by
a single  actor which makes  an initial announcement  of monetary policy  will have  an
incentive  to generate  increased  inflation once the private sector has formed its inflation
expectations. Anticipating  this ex post incentive,  private agents  build this inflation bias  into
their wage  contracts.
Barro and Gordon (1983b)  proposed  that reputational  effects  can solve  the time-
consistency problem. Given a sufficiently  high discount factor, the threat of futures losses
imposed  by price-setters  revising  their inflation expectations  upwards will mean that a
government  has more to lose from reneging  on its inflation announcement  than it stands  to
gain  from temporary positive shocks  to income. However,  the reputational outcome  is but
2one of multiple possible  equilibria  in this infinitely  repeated  game.' Moreover,  for many
governments  heavy discounting  of the future will eliminate  reputational  equilibria.
Pressures  to avoid  the next coup or to win the next election will be sufficiently  great  that a
government  will not value future losses  more highly than current gains  from opportunistic
behavior.
Rogoff  (1985)  suggested  that the delegation  of monetary policy to an independent
central  bank that places  greater  weight  than society  at large  on stabilizing  prices relative  to
stabilizing  output could be an alternative  solution  to the time-consistency  problem. He
assumed  away  the possibility  that political  actors might reverse  their decision  to delegate  or
that they might otherwise  influence  decisions  taken by the central  bank.  Nearly all
subsequent  research  has retained  this assumption. 2 However, substantial  evidence  from the
study of American  politics suggests  that partisan identification  of political  actors affects  the
decisions  of nominally  independent  bureaucratic  agencies  (Weingast  and Moran, 1983;  also
Muris'  comment  and their rejoinder  (1984)).
Lohmann (1998)  and Moser (1999)  relax the irreversibility  assumption  in their
analyses  of central  bank independence.  As we do, they argue  that multiple veto players  in
government  make it more difficult  to reverse  a decision  to delegate,  giving  independent
central  banks greater  scope  to reduce  the inflation bias. 3 In our theoretical  and empirical
1 Similar  problems  of multiple  equilibria  arise  when  monetary  policy  is modeled  as  a repeated  game  with
incomplete information,  where reputational  effects involve changing beliefs about a policy maker's "type".
2More  recent models of central bank independence involving incentive contracts (Walsh, 1995;  Persson and
Tabellini, 1993) or inflation targets (Svensson, 1997) assume that central bank independence is irrevocable.
Lohmann  (1992)  suggests  that society could improve  on Rogoff's solution of delegation to a conservative
central banker if there were implicit escape  clauses in the case of severe supply shocks, but the mechanism
through  which these clauses would be enforced is not specified.
3  In this paper we use the terms veto player and political actor interchangeably.
3analysis  we address  several  questions  not encompassed  by their contributions. Under what
conditions do checks  and balances,  by themselves,  mitigate  the credibility  problem that
increases  expected  inflation? How do changes  in agenda  control and political  polarization
affect  the impact  of checks  and balances  on firm expectations?  Given checks  and balances,
the assignment  of agenda-setting  authority and political  polarization,  what additional
influence  does an independent  central  bank have on expected  inflation?
3.  A model of checks and balances, central bank independence and inflation
The model  of the time consistency  problem in monetary policy  that anchors  this
paper follows  Barro  and Gordon (1983a).  The government  minimizes
(1)  LG  I  i+-bG(y,  -y*) 2 withrespectto  ,r, where
2'  2
(2)  y,=,-  + £,
where )re  =  expected  inflation, the price increases  that are programmed  by the private sector
in their contracts  prior to the realization  of the economic  shock and the policy decisions  of
the government  and where y*  is desired  output. Contracts are written first, setting  prices
and forming expectations  about inflation, then a shock to the economy  is experienced,  and
then the government  sets actual  inflation.
Private actors know that, after the shock is realized,  government  will set inflation
depending  on their own contractual  decisions  that set expected  inflation, given  by ;e*. That
is, the government  will solve  for the inflation outcome  that minimizes  its losses,  or, from
the minimization of (1):
bc  (7r'-  + y') (3a)  ir,  I  bQe  -~+y)
4After taking  expectations,  solving  for expected  inflation and substituting back into (3a),  the
problem yields  the following  well-known  solution  for inflation (suppressing  time subscripts
here and throughout).
(3b)  oT  =bGY  _  bG  .
I1+  bG
The inflation bias  - the amount of extra inflation generated  by the inability of the
government  to credibly  commit to its announced  inflation  policy - is  bGy*.
Discretionary  monetary  policy under checks  and balances
The model in this paper is developed  in two stages. In the first, a second  political
actor is introduced. To capture the idea  of checks  and balances,  both political  actors must
agree  on any change  in policy.
4 In the second  stage,  we add an independent  central  bank.
The two political  actors,  E and L (the executive  and legislature),  minimize loss
functions  as described  by (1) and (2):
(4)  L  i= I 7r2  + 1  bi(r -),re  + c _  Y')2.
2  2'
Each  has different  preferences,  bE,  bL  > 0, with respect  to the tradeoff  between income and
inflation. We examine  both the case  where bE < bL, where the executive  is more inflation-
averse  than the legislature,  and the reverse  case,  bL  < bE . The supply shock c is uniformly
distributed  over [-c,  c].
4 There  are  a number  of reasons  why  multiple  political  actors  might  have  an influence  on monetary  policy  in
the absence  of checks  and balances.  In a parliamentary  system,  for  example,  the minister  of finance  has
nominal  control  of monetary  policy,  but monetary  policy  decisions  may  well  be debated  in cabinet  or among
members  of  the governing  coalition.  In presidential  systems,  legislatures  may  exercise  veto  power  over  the
borrowing  authority  of government.
5The order of events is the following. First, price-setters  write wage  contracts,  fixing
expected  inflation. A shock occurs  and political  actors  then decide  what monetary policy  to
adopt. The action  taken by government,  if any, depends  on the realization  of the supply
shock e,.  If political  actors do not agree on a new rate of inflation, a default inflation
outcome  prevails. The default  option is an important feature  of the model since,  in real-
world decision  making,  the outcomes  that arise  from doing nothing affect  the willingness  of
veto players  to accept  new policy proposals.  '  The process  outlined in equations (1)  and (2)
allows inflation  to differ  from expected  inflation only if government  decision  makers
undertake some  policy  action after the realization  of the shock. If government  decision
makers  cannot agree  to undertake any action, then we assume  that actual inflation after  the
shock is realized  equals expected  inflation - the wage  increases  that private actors have  built
into their contracts  prior to the shock.
As in the original  Barro-Gordon  model, private agents  write their contracts prior to
the shock,  anticipating  that each  political actor would most prefer the following  inflation
policy after the shock (conditional  on the price inflation  they have built into their
contracts):6
b (,ze  _e+  Y*)
(5)  z,  =
Since  the preferences  of the Executive  and Legislature  diverge,  the inflation outcome
depends  on how their individual  preferences  are reflected  in the final government decision.
S The  seminal  article  is Romer  and  Rosenthal  (1979).  This  is a crucial  difference  between  our model  and  that
presented  by Moser  (1999),  who  assumes  that under  pure  checks  and  balances  the two actors  always  change
inflation  through  a bargaining  process  where  they  minimize  the sum  of their  loss  functions.  Neither  actor  is
permitted  to reject  this solution  in favor  of the  default  outcome.
6That is, the inflation  outcome depends  on the decision  making rules used to make policy.
We assume  that the decision  making  process  endows  the Executive  with agenda-setting
authority - the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it  offer to the other decision  maker. The
Executive  may be more or less  inflation-tolerant  than the Legislature  (bE  may be greater  than
or less  than bj. 7
We solve  for expected  inflation,  as usual, through backwards  induction. In the last
period, the political  actors observe  expected  inflation - the contracts  fixed  in the private
sector - and the supply shock. From (5)  we know that the size  of the shock affects  whether
each  decision  maker's  ex  post  preferred  inflation outcome is greater or less  than expected
inflation: the larger the supply  shock,  the lower is the inflation  rate preferred  by the
political  decision  relative  to expected  inflation. After the shock is realized,  there are three
possible  orderings  of the preferred  inflation outcomes  of the Executive  and Legislature
relative  to the default inflation outcome. WhenbE  < bL  , these are
7re < 71E < 7TL i  7TE <  ,e  < T)L;  and;7r < 7tL  < 7te.  When  bL  < bE , the ordering is the reverse:
,te  >  E  > rCL;  TE  > fe  > 7rL;  and irE > 7rL  > 7 e.  In each case,  these three alignments give
rise to four possible inflation outcomes.  The private actors attach probabilities to each of
these outcomes in establishing their inflation expectations.  The four outcomes germane to
the case where the Executive is less inflation-tolerant than the Legislature are:
6 Minimizing (4) with respect to ir and solving for it from the first order condition.
'In  the literature on legislative bargaining the actor with agenda setting power is sometimes chosen randomly
by nature (e.g., Baron and Perejohn,  1987, 1989). This is unnecessary in the case of monetary policy, when the
most plausible assumption is that private actors observe the identity of the agenda setter prior  to writing their
contracts.
7Casel:  . er <  iE  <  )r
In Case I, after the supply shock is realized, both the Legislature and Executive prefer
any inflation outcome greater than the default outcome.  Since the Executive has agenda
control, she can therefore propose her most preferred outcome, which is greater than the
default outcome, and the Legislature will agree to it.  Given expected inflation, government
decision makers therefore agree on the inflation outcome described in (6):
(6)  7c  = bEb(if  ±y*)
1±bE
CaseII:  l  E <  )ie  <  ffL
With this alignment in preferences, there is no inflation outcome that the Executive
would prefer to the defaul  outcome and that the Legislature would accept. Hence, the
default outcome is retained.  In this case, expected inflation and actual inflation are the same,
ex post,  and:
(7)  =rife
Case  IIIk  E <iE  )L  < ze  < 2,L  -E
In both Cases Im and IV, the Legislature and Executive prefer lower inflation than
would prevail under the default outcome.  Depending on the size of the supply shock, there
are two possible inflation outcomes the Executive might propose, one given by Case III and
one by Case IV.
The Executive would like to choose the lowest inflation outcome possible that meets
the condition that the Legislature is indifferent between the low inflation outcome and the
default outcome.  The losses of government decision makers rise as inflation outcomes
8deviate  above  or below their preferred  inflation outcomes. It is therefore feasible  for the
agenda  setter (the Executive)  to successfully  propose an inflation outcome less  than the
Legislature's  preferred  inflation outcome when default  inflation is above  the Legislature's
preferred  outcome. We assume  that the Executive  follows  a simple  rule in selecting  this
alternative: she chooses  an inflation alternative  such that the difference  between  the
Legislature's  preferred  outcome and the proposed  alternative  is equal  to the difference
between  default  inflation and the Legislature's  preferred  outcome.! That is, an inflation
outcome  nt  is  chosen  such  that ;rL  - if  =  /T-  ZL  , or
(8)  7f  =  (  )  _g
1+ bL
CaseIV:  7E  <  7L  < 2rL  rE  <  e
Under Case IV the default is sufficiently large relative to the Legislature's preferred
outcome that irE >  2;1L _,Fe  =  ;r.  By following the decision rule in Case III the Executive
would overshoot, and choose an inflation outcome even lower than her preferred outcome.
In this situation, Case IV, therefore, the Executive instead chooses z  = rE  or, as in Case I,
(9)  =bE(,re_,+  y*)
b  _  +  bE
8 In principle, the Executive should propose an inflation policy at such that  L L (ir)  L L (re)  . The expression
for it resulting from this quadratic equation, however, renders subsequent analysis intractable.  To retain
tractability without  sacrificing predictive power, we assume that the Legislature is indifferent between
inflation that is x points higher than its preferred outcome and x points  lower. We know, from differentiating
(4) with respect to  it,  that losses actually increase faster at higher levels of inflation.  The impact of our
assumption is therefore to understate the Executive's agenda setting authority  when  bE <  bL:  strictly
speaking, if default inflation is x points greater than the Legislature's preferred outcome, the Executive can
actually make an offer to the Legislature more than x points below the preferred outcome.  By the same token,
the assumption overstates the bargaining power of the Executive when  bL < bE .
9Private actors  therefore face  four possible  reactions  by government  to the contracts
that they sign,  given  by (6)  -(9). Their calculation  of expected  inflation is therefore  the
solution  to
___bE  _______  YF2bL(,T'-g 3+Y*') ,rl  FbE(7,Ceg 4+Y*)1
')  q[  ;+b  ] +  q 2X  + q3 [  t (  ;  S3  +  y  )  _ Zeib +  q+ [f  3  l+bL  )+bE
where the qi's  are the probabilities  that the government  will choose each of the four
different  inflation outcomes  after the shock is realized. They sum to one. The ki  are the
expected  values  of the economic  shock conditional  on the particular case  arising. For
example,  taking expected  inflation as given,  it is evident  that Case IV can only emerge  for
high realizations  of the supply  shock; i4  is the expected  value of the supply  shocks  over the
range  of shocks  conditional  on Case IV occurring. Assuming  a uniform distribution for c,
one can derive  expressions  for the probabilities  and for the expected  shocks, and then for
expected  inflation. This derivation  is found in Annex 2, where Equation A.12 is the
quadratic  equation  that gives  the solution  to expected  inflation. Annex 2 also  presents  the
case  where the Executive  is more inflation-tolerant  than the Legislature  (bL < bE).  Equation
A.  13  is the expression  for expected  inflation in this case.
We can use numerical  simulations  based  on equations  A.12 and A.13 to generate
comparative  statics  from the model  to assess  changes  in expected  inflation  when we move
from the Executive  as  sole decision  maker to checks  and balances. First, what is the impact
of the assignment  of agenda  control on the effect  of checks  and balances? Second,  what is
the impact  of "mean-preserving"  polarization of the preferences  of the two decision  makers,
10where "mean-preserving"  is defined  as an increase  in IL - bE I  holding (bL - bE )/2  constant?
Figure 1 illustrates the answers to these questions.
Figure 1 shows that expected inflation is far lower if the agenda setter (executive) is
more inflation-averse (the lower part of the figure) than more inflation-tolerant  (the upper
part). Another  way to see the importance of the agenda setter is to consider the case  where
there is no agenda setter and the two actors simply agree to minimize the sum of their loss
functions.  In this case, the inflation bias equals (bL - bE  ) y*  /2 .9  Under the assumptions of
Figure 1, this results in an expected value of inflation of 3 for all levels of polarization, lower
than if there is an inflation-tolerant  agenda setter, and higher than if the agenda setter is
inflation-averse.
Regardless of the preferences of the agenda setter, expected inflation lies increasingly
below the executive-only case as decision makers are more polarized; this effect is more
pronounced when the agenda setter (the executive) is less inflation-averse.  This asymmetry
is explained by the fact that polarization has two effects that operate differently depending
on whether the agenda setter is more or less inflation-averse.
First, as polarization  increases, the range over which the political actors cannot agree
to any change in monetary  policy - Case II - also increases. This should reduce expected
inflation regardless of the identity of the agenda setter since, in the region where policy
makers are unable to agree on a new inflation outcome, they are in particular unable to agree
on an increase in money supply to temporarily  boost output at the expense of increased
inflation.  In Figure 1, when the Executive is the more inflation-averse actor, an increase in
9  This is the institutional  set-up  assumed  in Moser (1999).
11polarization  from zero to three leads  to an increase  in the probability of landing in the
gridlock region from zero percent to 12  percent. When the Executive  is the less  inflation-
averse  decision  maker, an increase  in polarization  from zero to 2.6 leads  to an increase  in the
probability of retaining  the default  inflation  outcome from zero percent to 18  percent.
Second,  though, the probability of Case  IV - of a supply shock so great that the
Legislature  prefers  the Executive's  preferred  outcome  to the default outcome  - drops. This
attenuates  the leverage  of the agenda  setter,  since  her ability to propose her own preferred
outcome  diminishes. In the case  of the less  inflation-tolerant  Executive,  for example,
depicted  in the lower part of Figure 1, the probability of Case IV drops from 50  percent to
32 percent as one moves from no polarization  to polarization equal  to three. When the
Executive  is more inflation-tolerant  than the Legislature,  this probability drops from 50
percent to 30 percent as polarization  increases  to 2.6. Since  a reduction in the probability of
Case  IV essentially  reduces  the weight of the agenda  setter's  preferences  in expected
inflation,  the reduction has the effect  of increasing  expected  inflation  when the agenda-setter
is more inflation-averse,  but reducing  it when the agenda-setter  is less  inflation-averse.
When the agenda  setter is more inflation-averse,  the increasing  probability of Case  II
and the falling  probability of Case IV offset  each other. Consequently,  the presence  or
absence  of checks  and balances  creates  only a small difference  in expected  inflation at all
levels  of polarization (the lower part of Figure 1). However, when the agenda  setter is more
inflation tolerant, the increasing  probability of Case II and the declining  probability of Case
IV both operate  to reduce  expected  inflation;  hence,  the more notable impact  of polarization
when the agenda  setter is more inflation-tolerant  (the upper part of Figure 1). At higher
levels  of polarization,  in fact,  the leverage  of the agenda  setter is almost  completely
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attenuated: when polarization equals  2.6, expected inflation equals 3.09, compared to three
in the simple bargaining case.
The introduction of an independent central bank
The foregoing  argument shows that, relative to the case  where the Executive is the
sole decision maker, checks and balances  do not increase expected inflation significantly
when the Executive  is more inflation-averse,  and they do reduce it significantly  when the
Executive is less inflation-averse. This section evaluates  the contribution that an
independent central bank can make in each case.
13The argument  that inflation-averse  central  bankers  can reduce  inflation relies  on the
assumption  that delegation  of monetary policy is difficult  to reverse. Two arguments  are
frequently  used  to justify this assumption. One is that political  actors bear some exogenous
cost when they override a central bank (as in Jensen, 1997).  In order for central  bank
independence  to improve credibility  relative  to discretionary  monetary policy, however,
this cost must be greater  than the cost a government  would face  if it reneged  on a policy
announcement  in the absence  of delegation.
A second  argument  is that central bank independence  might be protected by a legal
stipulation  that the agreement  of more veto players  is required to reverse  delegation  than to
change  discretionary  monetary policy. So, for example,  the agreement  to delegate  is changed
only if both the legislature  and executive  agree,  while monetary policy in the absence  of
delegation  could be changed  by the executive  alone. In practice,  however, as footnote (4)
suggests  earlier,  even  in the absence  of delegation  the legislature  is likely to influence
discretionary  monetary policy.
The model  presented  above offers  a third explanation  of why legal  central  bank
independence  might reduce  the inflation bias, even if neither of the previous  conditions
hold. Because  the independent  central  bank has agenda  control, it can propose an inflation
outcome, after the realization  of the shock,  in such a way that the less  inflation-tolerant
political actor is no worse off than if the central  bank's decision  were overturned and the
two political  decision  makers  were required to agree  on an alternative.
To assess  the contribution of the central  bank under these circumstances,  we build on
the earlier model and assume  that price setters establish  long-term  contracts, a shock occurs,
the central bank determines  an inflation policy,  the two political  actors determine  whether
14to accept  the central  bank's policy  and, if they overturn it, they then agree  on an alternative
policy. We assume  that the political  actors cannot bind themselves  to any particular
inflation policy  until they first overturn the central bank's  policy.'" Therefore,  the policy
that prevails  should  they revoke  the central  bank's independence  is precisely  the policy that
would have  been instituted  under pure checks  and balances  (or gCH  in the discussion  that
follows).
The central  banker's loss function is
(1  1)  LCB=2  1  + 2 bCB(;t-  t  +  - y  Y2
2  2
an the central bank is more inflation-averse than either of the political actors (bcB <  bE ,bL)
The central bank's preferred inflation policy is:
(12)  1bCB  =bCB(e  +  y)
We assume that the bank is sufficiently inflation-averse that it always proposes the
lowest inflation alternative that is the same distance from the most inflation-averse political
actor's  preferred  outcome  as )CH  (TEl - z  =  ITCH  - 'E  ,when bL  < bE, and  ;L  - :  = 
1 TCH  - ;L
otherwise).  That is, there is no occasion when its own preferred inflation outcome is
actually greater than the outcome n chosen using this rule.  Given this rule, the central bank
will always propose an inflation outcome less than or equal to  McH and is never overridden.
The central bank makes its policy proposal after the supply shock is realized; depending on
the size of the supply shock, and as before, g.  can take on one of four possible values.
" Overturning  the central bank policy typically requires modifying the legislation governing central bank
independence; it is implausible to expect that a conjunctural  modification of monetary policy would be
15Knowing  that the central  bank's decision  depends  on the realization  of the shock,
and that the central  bank will always  select  an override-proof  inflation outcome,  private
actors  solve  for expected  inflation  using equation (13),  when bE<  bL. This is the same  as
equation  (9),  with the difference  that the central bank rather than the Executive  has agenda
control so that the anticipated  inflation outcomes  under each  case  are different  and
determined  by z,  - f  =  ¢CH  - ;E  -
b_  __  _  __  2bE('rTB  -~2  y*)  e  1
(13)  cB =qB  q1 CB  ;  +[)]  l+  q2  C  BCB  ]  +
e3h
2 C
6 A  l+bE  bL  bE+ffCBB+q4  1+bE L3  2(TCB_3  +  1+  +bE  bL )  ]  [  1+bE
The term  IceB  is expected  inflation in the presence  of a central  bank. The inflation
outcomes  associated  with each of'the four probabilities,  qi,  are the override-proof  policies
chosen  by the central  bank. So, for example,  if the shock is such  that Case I is realized,
rCB  <7E  < 7rL  I  YCH  =  E because  if the central  bank were overturned,  the Executive  would
propose and the Legislature  would accept  the Executive's  preferred  inflation outcome.
Knowing  this, the central  bank chooses r = 2ZE-  z,  and the inflation policy in the event
of Case  I is  therefore  E (  C1  b l  In Case  II, the inflation  outcome  in the event  of an
1+  bE
override of the central  bank's proposal is the default  outcome, or ZrCH  =  CB '  so  that the
central  bank  proposes  7r  = 2 zE - z  = 2bE1(r-  + +E  _  B)
1+bE  C
embedded  in such  legislation.
16If the Executive  - the agenda-setter  - is more tolerant of inflation than the
Legislature  (bL  < b), the central  bank then sets  policy such  that the Legislature  has no
incentive  to agree  to reverse  the central  bank. In this case,  the cases  remain  the same,  but the
inflation policy  chosen  in each case  by the central  bank change,  so that private actors  solve
~~14)  ~~  2bL  b_E  A  *J+  2bL  (f7CeBS_-2 +Y*  e
(1)+  b  1 + b  )(CB  1 + bL  CB+
1q+bL  +bE~_(rB  A+Y
q3 'CB  +  1 +  b[  I +  bE )  4
The solutions  to equations (13)  and (14)  are the private actors'  calculations  of expected
inflation when the agenda setter is more or less inflation-averse.  They are derived in Annex
3, and given by equations A.14 and A.15.
Figure 2:  The effect on expected inflation of central bank  independence
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Note:  For parameter values and definitions, see  Figure  1.
17Once again, using numerical simulations to generate comparative statics, we can
address the second main question of the paper: how does the inflation bias with checks and
balances and delegation compare with that under other institutional  arrangements? Figure 2
illustrates several important predictions of the model on the impact of an independent
central bank relative to checks and balances without a central bank.
First, expected inflation is always lower under checks and balances with a central
bank when compared to checks and balances and no central bank.  Second, the effect of a
central bank is most pronounced when the agenda setter is more tolerant of inflation and
polarization is high - the top and bottom lines in Figure 2.
It might seem counter-intuitive that expected inflation under the institutional
combination of checks and balances, a central bank, and an inflation-tolerant executive is
actually lower than under the combination of checks and balances, a central bank, and an
inflation-averse executive. This result derives from the fact that the leverage of the central
banker as agenda setter depends entirely on what the most inflation-averse decision maker
can achieve under pure checks and balances. When this decision maker is the executive and
has agenda control under pure checks and balances, she can achieve an outcome much closer
to her preferred inflation outcome than if the inflation-averse decision maker is the
legislature and does not exercise agenda control.  The further the checks and balances
outcome, xc,  from the preferred outcome of the inflation-averse decision maker, the lower
the inflation that the central bank can propose.  Hence, the central bank has the most
influence when the agenda setter, under checks and balances, is most tolerant of inflation.
184.  Testing the hypotheses
The model  underlines  the importance  of taking  political institutions and preferences
into account  when examining  the impact  of administrative  arrangements  such as central
bank independence  (or judicial  independence,  or the impact  of regulatory  agencies  on firm
decisions).  We can test three of the predictions  that emerge  from the foregoing  analysis.
1)  The  presence  of a legally  independent  central  bank should  have  a negative  effect  on inflation
only  in the  presence  of checks  and balances.
2)  Political  interference,  such  as  replacement  of central  bank  governors,  is less  likely when  checks
and balances  are  present.
3)  The  presence  of a legally  independent  central  bank has  a more  negative  effect  on inflation
when  different  branches  of government  have  divergent  preferences  over inflation.
The model suggests  other hypotheses,  related  to the interaction of the agenda  setter and
polarization. The absence  of data on agenda  setters  across  countries  means that tests of these
hypotheses  must be reserved  for future work.
The first hypothesis  bears  on an unresolved  puzzle in empirical  work on central
bank independence.  A number of papers have  found a statistically  significant  relationship
between  legal  measures  of central  bank independence  and inflation in advanced
industrialized  economies." 1 However, this relationship  has not been found in samples  that
include  both developed  and developing  countries (Cukierman,  Webb, and Neyapti, 1992).
We conclude,  in a sample  that includes  both developing  and developed  countries,  that legal
independence  can reduce  inflation bias, but that this depends  on the level of checks  and
'"  See for example Alesina and Summers (1993), Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti  (1992)  and Grilli, Masciandro
and Tabellini (1991).
19balances  in a country's political  system."
The second  hypothesis  is relevant  to previous  studies  of central  bank independence
and inflation,  which have  found that defacto measures  of independence,  such as the rate at
which central  bank governors  are replaced,  are negatively  correlated  with inflation, and that
this relationship  holds for both developed  and developing  countries. The evidence  that we
present  below suggests  that political  interference  in central  bank decision  making is more
difficult  under checks  and balances.
Finally,  the empirical  results  below  demonstrate  that the interaction  effect  of legal
independence  and checks  and balances  is significantly  greater in more polarized
environments,  consistent  with the third hypothesis. An additional  implication of the model
is that, regardless  of the identity of the agenda  setter, when decision  makers are not
polarized  (the left-hand  side of Figure 1),  checks  and balances  should  have little impact  on
expected  inflation. We find that checks  and balances  have an insignificant  effect  on inflation
outcomes  when polarization is low and central  banks are absent.
Data
As our proxy for the inflation bias,  we use the log of average  levels  of inflation as our
dependent  variable." 3 Our measure  of legal  central  bank independence  was developed  by
2 Lohmann  (1998),  in a case study of Germany that includes time-series tests, and Moser (1999), in an
econometric  investigation of 20 OECD  countries, also ask how the effect of legal independence varies with
levels of checks and balances.  Moser does not investigate the effects  of checks and balances on the turnover  of
central bank governors, the role of polarization,  or implications for developing countries.
13 This is based on consumer price index data from the IMF, International Financial  Statistics. An alternative
dependent variable used by Cukierman,  Webb, and Neyapti  (1992)  is a transformed rate of inflation x/(1 +t).
They argue this better represents the costs  to private agents of holding money balances than does the simple
rate of inflation, 7c,  and that it reduces the effect of outliers.  We have opted for log inflation in our regressions
both because of the ease of interpretation  of a semi-log model and because using log inflation results in data
which are much less heteroskedastic than when using either the simple or transformed  rate of inflation.
20Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti  (1992),  based on sixteen different characteristics of central
bank statutes such as the term  of office for the governor, provisions for his or her
replacement, limits on central bank lending to government, and procedures for resolution of
conflicts between central bank and government.  The data for CBl cover 72 countries and
are reported by decade over the four decades from 1950 to 1989.14  The component of CBI
which measures rules concerning the tenure of the central bank governor is also used
separately and is labeled CEO.
These authors have also developed defacto measures of independence.  Cukierman,
Webb, and Neyapti  (1992)  argue that high turnover  of central bank governors is indicative
of low independence and show that the rate of turnover  is positively and significantly
correlated with inflation in a sample including both  developed and developing countries.
This paper uses an improved defacto measure of central bank independence developed by
Cukierman and Webb (1995), which represents the frequency with which central bank
governors are replaced in the six months following changes in government.  This measure,
governor turnover, is also positively and significantly correlated with inflation.' 5
With respect to checks and balances in government, one would ideally like to have
information on the number of political actors who exercise veto power over monetary
policy, along with the inflation preferences of these actors.  Given the paucity of cross-
1
4 We use Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti's  weighted index which they call LVAW.  Due to missing data the
total number of observations for this variable is 236 (see  Table II for a summary).  The four periods are divided
as follows, 1950-69,  1960-71,  1972-79, 1980-89.
" In a few cases  governor turnover could not be coded because a country did not experience a change of
government during the period.  This results in the exclusion of only 4 potential  observations from our Table
HI regressions. governor turnover  is measured in two time periods 1950-71  and 1972-89.
21country data in this area,  two proxy variables  are used that capture the institutional aspects
of checks  and balances  but not the preferences  of the actors.
The first is the index of executive  constraints,  developed  by Gurr, Jaggers,  and Moore
in the Polity HI dataset. Their measure  is based  on a subjective  assessment  of different
countries  over time following  a pre-specified  methodology  where values  range  from one,
"no regular  limitations  on the executives  actions",  to seven,  when groups  such as  the
legislature  have "effective  authority equal  to or greater  than the executive  in most areas  of
activity". The construction of executive  constraints  has the advantage  of considering  not just
whether there are formal, constitutional  limitations  on executive  power but also whether
these limits  exist  in practice.
A second,  more recent measure  of checks  and balances  developed  by Keefer  (1998)
has the advantage  of being based  on objective  criteria and of capturing aspects  of checks  and
balances  not measured  by executive  constraints,  such as the existence  of coalition
governments,  or divided control of two chambers  in a bicameral  system. The variable  checks
is constructed  based  on variables  in a new database  of political  institutions assembled  by
Beck,  Clarke, Groff, Keefer,  and Walsh (1999).  This data is available  for the last two decades
of our sample  (1970-89).  The index is based  on a formula which first counts the number of
veto players,  based  on whether the executive  and legislative  chamber(s)  are controlled  by
different  parties  in presidential  systems  and on the number of parties in the government
coalition for parliamentary  systems  (as  described  in greater  detail in Annex 1). The index is
then modified  to take account  of the fact that certain electoral  rules (closed  list vs. open list)
affect  the cohesiveness  of governing  coalitions. Since  the effects  of checks  and balances
22hypothesized  in the model are likely to be strongest  at lower levels of checks  than at higher
levels,  we use a log  version of checks,  log  check,  in our regressions." 6
In order to test the proposition regarding  polarization  one would ideally  have
information on the inflation  and output preferences  of different  political  parties. This data
is not available. Instead,  we use two measures  of polarization. One, political  polarization,  is
taken from the database  of political  institutions (Beck,  et al.). The four largest  parties and
the executive  in each  country were scored  according  to whether the data sources  indicated
parties as having  an economic  orientation that was left, center or right. This information  is
used  to assess  the maximum  difference  between those  entities  that comprise  the checks
indicator explained  earlier. This maximum  constitutes  the politicalpolarization  measure.
Our second  measure  of polarization is a society-wide  indicator. The argument is
simply  that where society  at large is more polarized,  the representatives  of society  that are
selected  to the various  branches  of government  are more likely to be polarized  as well.
Social  polarization has been  proxied in the cross-country  empirical  literature by data  from
Sullivan  (1991),  the size of the principal ethno-linguistic  group as a percent of the
population. We diverge  from the literature by transforming  this variable  in a way that is
theoretically  more consistent  with notions of polarization." 7 Theory suggests  that societies
are most likely  to have  polarized  preferences  when there are a few equally sized  groups,  as
opposed  to one dominant group or many smaller groups. The variable  social  polarization  is
16  Otherwise this variable would give as much weight to a change from  1 to 2 veto players as from 4 to 5; since
our model speaks to the first case and is silent about the second, the log formulation  is more appropriate.
1  The pioneering paper here is Easterly and Levine (1997). Unlike us, they assume a monotonic  relationship
between ethnic fractionalization and social polarization.
23therefore a transformation  of the Sullivan  measure  to more closely  approximate  this
theoretical  requirement."
Table I: Summary  statistics
Variable  No.  mean  std.  min.  max.
obs.  Dev.
log  inflation  217  -2.53  1.12  -5.81  0.81
CBI  236  0.34  0.13  0.09  0.69
CEO  236  0.48  0.20  0.06  0.94
Governor  194  0.26  0.33  0  1.5
turnover
Executive  226  4.73  2.24  1  7-
constraints
log  check  133  0.95  0.47  0  1.92
Openness  197  0.30  0.23  0.03  1.90
political  132  0.51  0.78  0  2
polarization
socialpolarization  162  1343  823  0  2499
log  GDP  171  1.18  1.02  -1.26  280
We use one additional  control variable,  openness,  measured  as imports of goods  and
services  divided  by GDP (International  Financial  Statistics).  This follows  Romer (1993),  who
argues  that as imports increase  as a share  of total consumption,  policy makers  have  less  of an
ex  post  incentive  to inflate. Since  the central  bank independence  variable  is only available  by
decade,  other controls, such as GDP growth, or terms of trade movements, are precluded.
l  This variable  attains  its maximum  when the largest  ethnic group represents  50%  of the population and its
minimum  when the largest  ethnic  group represents  either 0% or 100%  of the population. The formula  is social
polarization=  (% share largest  group) - (%  share largest  group) 2 where data on ethnic  groups is used  from
Sullivan  (1991).  This approach  yields  a variable  that matches  the theoretical  requirements  of polarization
outlined in Esteban  and Ray (1994).
24However, we follow Cukierman,  Webb, and Neyapti (1992) and include decade dummy
variables to control for unobserved characteristics specific to each time period.
Testing  proposition  1: cbecks  and balances  and central bank independence
In order to examine whether legal central bank independence has a stronger negative
impact on inflation in countries with checks and balances, we use a model with  interaction
terms that allows the marginal effect of central bank independence on inflation to vary with
the extent of checks and balances. The general form of regressions 24 in Table II (decade
dummies omitted) is shown in equation 15.
(15) log inflation = ac +  ACBI  +  B 2checks var.  + f,l  (checks var.*CBI + fi,4 penness
The interaction term is predicted to have a negative coefficient.  The net effect of central
bank independence, given by A, + fl3*(checks  variable), should be to reduce inflation only at
high levels of checks and balances. Table II reports the results of four OLS regressions.
The theoretical analysis demonstrates that, under a range of circumstances, the mere
presence of checks and balances can generate a lower inflation bias.  Regressions 1 and 2
provide support for this argument:  the coefficients on executive constraints and on log check
are negative and significant. As in previous research, legal central bank independence has no
significant impact on inflation when it enters linearly, and openness is significantly and
negatively correlated with inflation.
Regressions 3 and 4 test our first hypothesis, interacting legal central bank
independence with three different measures of checks and balances. The interaction term is
negative and significant, as predicted, in both cases. The combined effect of an increase in
25central  bank independence  (taking  into account  both the linear  term CBI  and the interaction
term) is negative  in both regressions  at high levels  of checks  and balances.
Table II: Checks and balances, central bank independence, and inflation
depvar: log inflation  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Constant  -2.16  -0.98  -3.15  -2.17
(0.27)  (0.33)  (0.42)  (0.63)
CBI  -0.19  0.11  3.14  3.48
(0.44)  (0.64)  (1.30)  (1.82)
openness  -1.15  -1.17  -1.17  -1.22
(0.26)  (0.28)  (0.26)  (0.29)
executive  constraints  -0.11  0.08
(0.03)  (0.06)
CBI  * exec.  constraints  -0.60
(0.20)
log  check  -0.66  0.47
(0.21)  (0.53)
CBI  * log  check  -3.16
(1.48)
0.39  0.21  0.42  0.24
N  183  123  183  123
p-value for F stat.  p < 0.01  P < 0.01  p < 0.01
OLS  with  White's  heteroskedastic  consistent  standard  errors  reported  in parentheses.  Period
dummies  not reported.
More concretely,  in a parliamentary  system with a three party governing  coalition
(log  check=  1.6),  a one standard  deviation  increase  in legal central  bank independence  would
be predicted  to reduce  annual average  inflation by approximately  20 percent. 19 In contrast,
in a parliamentary  system  with a single  party majority (log  check=  1.1),  the predicted  change
in inflation  would be close  to zero (0.1  percent higher than otherwise). This suggests  an
explanation  for Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti's finding  that CBI  is significantly  and
19 That is,  for example,  a drop  in inflation  from 10  percent  per year  to 8 percent  per year.
26negatively  correlated  with inflation in advanced  industrial countries  but not in developing
countries:  developing  countries,  on average,  have  lower levels  of checks  and balances.
Testing  proposition  2: cbecks  and balances  and political influence on central banks
While our results  show that legal  central bank independence  is predicted  to have a
more negative  effect  on inflation at high levels  of checks  and balances,  our model also  has
implications  for defacto  measures  of central  bank independence,  such as the frequency  with
which central  bank governors  are replaced  following  changes  in government (governor
turnover). Replacement  of governors  should be more difficult  when a central  bank's statutes
offer tenure guarantees  and when checks  and balances  are present. In the absence  of checks
and balances,  legal  protections  of tenure are easier  to modify and therefore less  effective  in
constraining  political  actors.
This argues  in favor of estimating  a system  of equations  where inflation is a function
of governor  turnover, and governor turnover is itself endogenous  to legal  protections  of
tenure and checks  and balances. Equations 16  and 17  below describe  such a system (with
period dummies  omitted and recalling  that CEO measures  legal  protection of tenure). A
variable  for checks  and balances  is included  in both equations,  because  our model  predicts
that checks  may have  a direct effect  on inflation as well as an indirect effect  (via  central  bank
independence).  The variable CEO, on the other hand, should only influence  inflation
through its effect  on governor turnover.
(16)  governor  turnover  =  a  +  61CEO + /i2checks  var + fi3checks  var * CEO
(17)  log inflation =  a  +  6,governor turnover + /J5openness  +fl6  checks var
27Table HI reports results from Two Stage Least Squares estimation of these equations.
The key result is actually the first equation in each of the two models (one model for each
measure of checks), which tests proposition  2, that turnover  of central bank governors is
determined by the interactive effect of checks and balances and laws protecting the tenure of
governors.  The interaction term in our estimations of equation (16) has the expected
negative sign in each case. The higher the level of checks and balances, the more negative
the predicted political influence on the central bank.  In the case of the system estimated
using log check, the interaction term is significant at the 5 percent level while the interaction
term in the system estimated with executive constraints  has the expected sign but is not
statistically significant.
The second equation in each model bears on the finding in prior  research that legal
central bank independence is an insignificant determinant of inflation, but governor
turnover a significant determinant,  in samples that include both rich and poor countries.
The discussion of the first proposition explains one part of this anomaly:  the insignificance
of legal central bank independence results from the omission of political institutions.  The
second equations in Table HI suggest an institutional explanation for the other part of the
anomaly, as well.  The value of turnover predicted from political and legal institutions has a
positive influence on inflation, although the coefficients on governor turnover are not
significant at conventional levels.
The substantive results are also consistent with those from the test of proposition  1.
In a parliamentary system with a ruling coalition of three parties (log check=  1.6), a one
standard deviation increase in CEO is predicted to change governor turnover by -0.07,
translating into a decrease in annual average inflation of  13 percent.  In contrast, in a similar
28system  with a single  party government  (log  check  =  1.1),  a one standard  deviation  increase  in
CEO has essentially  no effect  on turnover (+  0.003)  or inflation (+  0.5 percent).
Table III: Formal independence, de facto independence and checks  and balances
Model 1  Model 2
Dep. Variable a  turnover  ln(inflation)  turnover  ln(inflation)
Constant  0.25  -3.48  0.17  -2.11
(0.16)  (1.17)  (0.21)  (0.80)
Governor  turnover  2.95  1.79
(2.51)  (1.26)
Openness  -0.68  -1.62
(1.10)  (0.58)
CEO  0.26  0.85
(0.28)  (0.42)
Exec.  Constraints  -0.03  -0.01
(0.02)  (0.09)
CEO * exec.  -0.03
Constraints  (0.05)
log  check  0.09  -.05
(0.19)  (0.35)
CEO * log  check  -0.76
(0.39)
0.14  0.27  0.15  0.24
N  163  163  106  106
Prob>Chi2 p<0.01  P<0.01  P<0.01  p<0.01
model
Two-stage  least  squares;  the first  stage  (not  reported  here)  is turnover  as  a function  of openness,  CEO,
CEO*checks  variable,  and  the checks  variable.  Period  dummies  not reported.
Testing  proposition  3:  polarization and central bank independence
Checks and balances  should matter most when there are preference  differences
among  various  political  veto players. Our model predicts  that the higher the level of
29polarization  between  veto players  in government  (with respect  to inflation  and output
preferences),  the greater  the impact of central bank independence  and checks  and balances
on inflation. 20 To test this proposition,  we re-run  the regressions  from Table  II, splitting  the
sample  between  high polarization and low polarization  country-decades  (based  on the
median  value of our two polarization  variables  social  polarization  (in Table  IV) and  political
polarization (in Table V).
The first notable result in the two tables is that, as we would predict from Figure 1,
the presence  of checks  and balances  makes  little difference  in expected  inflation at low levels
of polarization  and at low levels  of central  bank independence. At higher levels  of
polarization,  the effect  of checks  and balances  depends  on details  of the agenda-setting
institutions  about which we have no cross-country  data.
The results  are also consistent  with the predictions  of proposition 3. For both
measures  of polarization  and both measures  of checks  and balances,  the interaction  terms
CBI  * checks  are of the largest  magnitude,  negative  and highly significant  in the high
polarization  sub-samples.  In the low polarization  sub-samples,  the interaction  terms are
generally  small and not statistically  significant. The exception  is the interaction  term using
executive  constraints  in the low polarization sub-sample  of Table V. However, although  it is
negative  and significant,  it is nonetheless  smaller  in magnitude  than the coefficient  on the
interaction  term in the high polarization sub-sample.
20These effects  should vary with the identity of the agenda  setter, which we cannot capture in our empirical
tests. Polarization  can also  have  other effects  that we do not model. Alesina  and Gatti (1995)  argue  that
central  bank independence  will reduce  variance  of output and of inflation in countries  with polarization  across
governments  by minimizing  partisan  business  cycles.
30Table IV: Social  polarization, central bank independence, and checks and balances
depvar:  log infl.  low pol  high pol  Low pol  high pol
constant  -1.72  1.35  -0.96  -2.40
(1.00)  (0.23)  (1.41)  (0.66)
CBI  -1.16  5.67  -0.10  4.66
(2.48)  (1.73)  (3.64)  (1.98)
openness  -1.10  -1.37  -2.16  -0.98
(0.90)  0.30)  (0.79)  (0.26)
exec.  constraints  -0.10  0.19
(0.14)  (0.08)
CBI  * exec.  constraints  0.04  -1.04
(0.37)  (0.28)
log  check  -0.17  0.11
(1.11)  (0.52)
CBI  * log  check  -0.32  -2.94
(3.11)  (1.45)
R2 0.38  0.55  0.18  0.40
N  90  87  55  62
p-value  for F stat.  p<0.01  p < 0.01  p-0.11  p < 0.01
Table V: Political  polarization, central bank independence, and checks  and balances
depvar:  log infl.  low pol  high pol  Low pol  high pol
CBI  4.97  10.13  1.20  4.65
(1.84)  (5.00)  (3.24)  (2.66)
openness  -1.26  -1.30  -1.11  -1.25
(0.30)  (0.71)  (0.31)  (0.86)
exec.  constraints  0.17  0.24
(0.11)  (0.23)
CBI  * exec.  constraints  -0.89  -1.57
(0.33)  (0.73)
log  cbeck  -0.83  1.05
(1.10)  (0.72)
CBI  * log  check  -0.10  -4.40
(3.22)  (1.88)
R2  0.31  0.22  0.33  0.16
N  66  51  72  50
p-value  for F stat.  p <.001  p-0.01  p <.001  P-0.06
Note:  OLS  with White's heteroskedastic  consistent  standard  errors reported in parentheses. Period  dummies
not reported. It was  not possible  to split the samples  evenly  in Table V because  political  polarization  had a
value  for zero for more  than half of the observations.
31Robustness
The evidence  presented  in this section  indicates  that our results are not driven by
serial  correlation,  by the endogeneity  of legal  central  bank independence  to inflation or
lagged  inflation,  by omitted variables,  including  political  instability, nor by outliers.
Results  of Lagrange  multiplier tests suggest  serial  correlation of the error terms might
have led to inconsistent  estimates  of standard  errors in the tests of the first two
propositions. 21 However, the results  in Tables  II and III are robust to controls for serial
correlation.'  In particular, regressions  3 and 4 of Table  II are robust to the inclusion  of a
lagged  dependent  variable.'  Similarly,  the introduction of a lagged  inflation variable  in the
tests of proposition two had little effect  on the results  in Table III. Since  the introduction of
a lagged  dependent  variable  significantly  reduces  sample  size,  we have preferred  to present
results from the original  specification  in Tables  Im  and IV.
It is possible  that countries  adopt legally  independent  central  banks in response  to
bouts of high inflation, perhaps  prodded by the international  financial  community, making
CBI endogenous  to lagged  values  of inflation, a second  possible  source  of inaccuracy  in our
results. There are both theoretical and empirical  responses  to this possibility. Theoretically,
the model and the tests reported in Table  II are valid even  if the adoption of central  bank
21 The  null  of no autocorrelation  was  rejected  at  the p < .001  for each  of  the regressions.
Our preferred  methods  of addressing  the problem  (such  as using  Newey-West  standard  errors) are infeasible
since they yield inconsistent results in data sets with small numbers  of time periods relative to cross-section
observations.
23  P-values for the coefficients on the interaction terms in the checks  and executive constraints specifications
both remained significant at the 10% level (at p=0.0 67 and p=0.068  respectively).  Lagrange multiplier tests
following the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable could not reject the null hypothesis of no
autocorrelation.  We also transformed our data set into cross-section variables over the whole time period.  If
serial correlation were responsible for the results we report,  these results should disappear in cross-section
regressions.  Results for executive constraints remained significant, and results using log checks  retained the
correct sign.
32independence  is motivated by high bouts of inflation. If past inflation leads  countries  to
adopt central bank independence,  we predict that the effects  of this would be different  in
high and low checks  countries. In low checks  countries,  this process  would lead to a
positive  association  between inflation and central  bank independence,  since  private actors
would not view independence  as credible  and inflation  persistence  would therefore not be
reversed. In high checks  countries,  on the other hand, the adoption of an independent
central  bank in response  to past inflation would reduce  inflation expectations.
Empirically,  we find little evidence  that central  bank independence  is endogenous  to
lagged  inflation,  in any case. CBI  is not "Granger-caused"  by lagged  inflation.  Similarly,  the
CEO component  of CBI,  used in the tests of proposition two to capture legal  provisions
regarding  governor  tenure, is not "Granger-caused"  by lagged  inflation. Granger  tests do
suggest  that defacto central  bank independence  as measured  by governor  turnover is
significantly  correlated  with lagged  inflation. However, when we estimate  the regressions  in
Table  m including  lagged  inflation as a right-hand  variable  in the turnover regressions,  the
results  are consistent  with the initial regressions,  although  the sample  size is significantly
reduced. 24
It is also  possible  that CBI  or CEO are endogenous  to contemporary inflation, since
the four periods encompassed  by the data are each  long, as much as 11  years. However,
when we instrument for CBI  with lagged  CBI  in the tests in Table  II, Hausman specification
24 In the  check  specification  in Table  III,  the  interaction  term  in the turnover  regressions  actually  increased
slightly  in magnitude  and  became  more  significant  with coefficient  -0.80  and  standard  error (0.38).  In the
executive  constraints  specification  the  interaction  term  remained  negative  but was  not significant  -0.024  (0.055).
33tests do not reject  the original  OLS estimates." 3 Results  are similar when we instrument for
CEO with lagged  CEO in the Table m turnover regressions  which test proposition 2.26
The influence  of omitted variables  on central  bank independence,  checks  and
balances  and inflation is a third possible  source of spurious results  in the regressions
presented  earlier. However, our results  are robust to the inclusion  of additional  variables
suggested  by the literature.
The first of these is income per capita. A country's level of income might
simultaneously  influence  both inflation and the efficacy  of an independent  central  bank. If
this were the case,  central bank independence  should not be a significant  determinant of
inflation, after controlling  for income,  and income itself should  be significant. However,
when entered into our Table II regressions,  the log of real GDP per capita  is never
significant  and leaves  the estimates  of the interaction  terms nearly  unchanged.'
Nor is it the case  that checks  and balances  are simply  proxies for income per capita.
It is true that the checks  and balances  variables  are correlated  with income. The question,
then, is whether the results for the interaction  terms CBI * checks  are spurious, and driven
by the relationship  of checks  and balances  to income. If this were the case,  our findings
25 The null that the differences  between  the parameter  estimates  from an OLS estimation  of regressions  3 and 4
from Table  m and an instrumental  variables  estimation  are not significant  (and  thus that the OLS  estimates
were consistent)  could not be rejected  in any of the three cases. These tests also  involved  instrumenting  for the
interaction  term CBI  x checks  var. P-values  for the tests  in the check  and executive  constraints  specifications
were p  _0.97 and  p >0.99.
26This involved  estimating  the turnover regressions  alone,  rather than the two-equation  system. Based  on a
comparison  of OLS and IV estimates  of the governor  turnover regressions,  in the checks  and executive
constraints  specifications  the p-values  for the Hausman  specification  test were p >0.99 and p-0.91.  In
addition,  CEO  was  not significantly  correlated  with lagged  inflation.
27 In regressions  3 and 4 p-values  for the coefficient  on real  GDP are 0.98  and 0.35  respectively.  The
coefficients  and standard  errors for our interaction  terms in each regression  are -0.47  (0.21)  and -2.52  (1.55).
34would simply  be replicating  earlier results  showing  that CBI  is significantly  correlated  with
inflation in developed  countries  but not in developing  countries.
To assess  this possibility,  we compare  the explanatory  power of specifications  in
regressions  2,3 and 4 of Table II with a specification  that substitutes  log GDP  and log
GDP*CBI  for the respective  checks  variables  and checks*CBIvariables. The J-test  proposed
by Davidson  and MacKinnon  (1981)  allows  us to compare  the explanatory  power of the
alternative  specifications.  These  tests strongly  reject  the GDP specification  in favor  of the
executive  constraints  and log  check  specifications. 28 We repeated  this exercise  with the two
regressions  in Table MI  in which governor  turnover is the dependent  variable. In both cases,
the J-test rejects  the GDP specification  in favor of the checks  specification. 29
A second  omitted variable  is the interaction  of openness  and legal  central  bank
independence.  Romer (1993)  argues  that the negative  association  between openness  and
inflation  is weaker  in countries  with more independent  central banks,  suggesting  that an
interaction  term, CBI  * openness,  should be included  in regressions  attempting  to assess  the
impact of independence  on inflation. 30 There are two ways  to examine  the robustness  of our
results  to Romer's  argument.
28 These  tests  involve  estimating  the  two alternative  specifications  and  then  re-estimating  each  specification
while  including  the  fitted  values  from  the alternative  model  as  a parameter.  The  t-statistic  on the fitted  values
can  be interpreted  as  a test  of the null  that the  alternative  specification  would  not add  explanatory  power  to
the  existing  model.  In the case  of the existing  regressions  3 and  4 the null  could  not be rejected  (p-0.59  and
p =0.10  respectively)  while in the case  of the GDP specification  the null was rejected  (p=0.01 and  p=0.04).
29 Based on OLS estimates of this equation, in the three existing specifications using the checks variables the
null could not be rejected (exec.  constraints p=0.50,  log  check  p=0.39).  With the GDP specifications the null
was always rejected at p < 0.01.
3  His tests of this proposition  are only successful with indices of independence that include measures of
governor turnover,  however.
35First, we add the interaction term CBI * openness  to the Table II specifications. 31 This
interaction term is not significant in any specification, consistent with Romer's own
investigation.  More importantly,  the CBI * checks interaction terms generally retain their
significance. Second, we add an interaction term governor turnover * openness  to our
inflation regressions in Table III.  In this case as well, the openness interaction  term is never
significant and its inclusion does not affect the results reported earlier.
It might also be argued that political instability explains our results: countries that
exhibit checks and balances are less stable, and it is their instability, rather than checks and
balances, that generates our results.  The evidence suggests  that this is not the case, however.
First, the correlation between three measures of political instability and the checks  variable
(all from the Database of Political Indicators) is slightly positive (7 percent) in two cases, and
negative (-17  percent) in a third case. Second, the results in Table Im are robust to the
inclusion of instability.
A final robustness issue concerns the influence of outliers.  3 2 In general, after outliers
are excluded, our results are still consistent with our theoretical propositions  concerning
inflation, central bank independence, and checks and balances.  There is only one notable
change in the Table II regressions after the exclusion of outliers: the coefficient on the
interaction term CBI * log check becomes less negative (-2.45), but nevertheless remains
highly significant. The interaction term CBIx exec.  constraints, though,  remained both
31 Since  this hypothesis  is  not mutually  exclusive  with  our checks  hypothesis,  a non-nested  test  like  the  J-test  is
not appropriate  here.
36economically significant (coefficient equal to -0.59) and statistically significant.  Similarly, in
the 2SLS  regressions in Table III, results with regard to the two interaction  terms CEO *
checks  and CEO*executive  constraints are similar to the original estimates after outliers are
excluded. 33 In particular, governor turnover  retains a high association with the interaction
terms, although the association between governor turnover and inflation weakens after
outliers are excluded.
Finally, results on polarization in Tables IV and V are largely robust to the exclusion
of outliers.  In Table IV, the coefficients on the interaction terms in the low polarization
-sub-samples remain insignificant, while in the high polarization sub-samples they remain
economically large and of the right sign, but in one of the two cases lose statistical
significance. 34 For the Table V regressions, the results for the executive  constraints
regressions were also robust to the exclusion of outliers.  The results for the regressions
using check  were not robust, however. 35
5.  Conclusion
Governments seek to improve the quality and credibility of policy making by
delegating to independent agencies in a wide range of policy areas, ranging from monetary
policy to judicial dispute resolution to securities regulation.  This paper is an attempt to
32 Classification  of outliers  was based  on dfbeta  values  calculated  for each  coefficient  in our regressions.  This is
an appropriate  indicator  to the extent  we are concerned  that individual  observations  may have  very large
effects  on our coefficient  estimates.  Observations  with an absolute  value  of the dfbeta > 2/sqrt(N) were
excluded. This involved  the dfbetas  relevant  to the interaction  terms (when  one was present) and  to governor
turnover (for  the inflation regressions  in Table III).
3  Coefficients  and standard  errors for the interaction terms in the checks  and executive  constraints  regressions
were -0.66 (0.44)  and -0.5 (0.06).
3  The exception  here  was the regression  with log  check  where the coefficient  on the CBI  x log  check  interaction
term lost some  significance  (p  =0.36).
37advance our understanding of the role of delegation by deepening the political arguments
surrounding central bank independence and testing them on a broad and disparate set of
countries.  We introduce theory and evidence to make several points.  First, depending on
institutional and political details - the nature of agenda setting and the extent of political
polarization - checks and balances are likely to reduce inflation expectations relative to
countries that lack such institutions.  Second, the delegation of decision making to agencies
can only improve policy outcomes when checks and balances are a feature of a country's
political system.  Third, the impact of delegation depends, in turn, on political polarization
and the structure of agenda setting.
The evidence for these points is direct: central banks are associated with better
inflation outcomes in the presence of checks and balances. It is also indirect: the turnover of
central bank governors is reduced when governors have tenure protections supported by
political checks and balances; the impact of checks and balances is low when polarization is
low; and checks and balances make the biggest contribution  to central bank effectiveness  in
more polarized societies.
These results suggest that policy reformers face frustration  if, in the absence of
appropriate political institutions, they grant policy making authority to formally
independent agencies. It is undeniable that these institutions, such as courts or central
banks, can sometimes achieve a high level of prestige and respect such that citizens are
willing to turn out governments that abridge their independence.  However, at least in the
case of central banks, the evidence suggests  that prestige alone is insufficient to guarantee
3  The coefficient on the interaction term in the low polarization sub-sample was -6.84 (2.85) while the
38independence.  Political institutions,  instead, are crucial to the sustainability and
effectiveness  of decision making by independent agencies.
coefficient  in the high  polarization  sub-sample  was  -5.16  (3.05).
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42Annex 1: The checks  and political polarization measures
Both checks  and  political  polarization  are taken from the Database  of Political
Institutions  (Beck,  et al.). In the DPI, checks  is called  Check2, and  politicalpolarization  is
called  Polariz2.
For presidential  systems,  checks  is the sum of 1 for the president  and 1 for each
legislative  chamber. The value is increased  by 1 if an electoral  competition index  developed
by Bates,  Ferree,  and Singh  is greater  than 4 (out of a possible  7). Also, in closed  list systems
where the president's  party is the 1st government  party, the legislature  is not counted.  For
parliamentary  systems,  checks  is the sum of 1 for the prime minister and 1 for each party in
the governing  coalition. If elections are based  on a closed  list system  and the prime
minister's  party is the 1st government  party, then this sum is reduced  by one. As for
presidential  systems,  the value of checks  is modified  upwards  by 1  if the value of the index
for electoral  competition is greater than 4.
The construction of political  polarization begins  with the assignment  of values  to the
orientation measures  (Left  = -1,  Center  = 0,  Right  = 1). In presidential  systems,  if the
president's  party has an absolute  majority in the legislature,  then polarization  is set equal to
zero. If not, polarization  is the maximum  difference  between the president's  party's
orientation and the weighted  average  of the orientations  of the three largest  government
parties  and the largest  opposition  party. For parliamentary  systems,  if the prime minister's
party has an absolute  majority in the legislature,  polarization is again  zero. If not, the value
is the maximum  difference  between  the values  of the three largest  government  parties.
43Annex 2: Derivation of expected  inflation under checks  and balances
Private actors  solve  for expected  inflation using  equation (10),
,e  FbE(;re  -il+y1  e  2b  (,,e _b3+y*)  e]bE  (;re  _  4 +  )1
[1 L  l+bE  +q 2 bL  +q 3L  (  L  )+bE
where the qi's are the probabilities of each of the four decision making outcomes and sum to
one, and the £i are the expected values of the range of economic shocks over which these
four possible outcomes can occur.
The probability q,,describes the likelihood that the shock will be such
thatzTe  <27E  <ffL  That  is, qi=pr[<e  l:bE  (y* - 6+ 7r)]  or
(A.1)  q, = pr  6 < _  I  + y
Similarly, q2 is the probability that  ;rE  <  ,e  < ;ZL  or
(A.2) q2 =  P{  Ire  Y  +y  ]
q3 is pr[2rL < 7Te<  2;fL  - E ]or
(A.3)  q3= PLf1  2e+  y* < <  re+  Y  (1+bE)(1+bL  ),rel
LbL  (1  +bE)2bL  -(1 +bL)bE  j
and q 4 is  pr[,rL < 27rL  _ZE  < Te]  or
(A.4) q4 =p  s >;r  e +  (1+bE)(1+bL)  ,el
L  (1 + bE)2bL - (1 + bL )bE  j
Set K=  (1+bE)(1 +bL)
(1  +bE)2bL  -(1 +bL)bE
44In order to fix  the value of inflation that they expect,  the private actors solve  for the
qi's  and k"  's in terms of the parameters  and expected  inflation. They then substitute  the
resulting  terms into equation (10)  and solve  for expected  inflation in terms of desired  output
and the preference  parameters  bi. To carry out this exercise,  assume  c is distributed
uniformly over the range [-c,  c]. Given  this uniform distribution, (A.  1)  can be rewritten as
1-T+Y  1(1 (A.4) q, =i  c  d.  = 2  (-b  f+Y  +cJ
2c  c  b
The average  value of the shock over this range, £', is therefore
(A.5)  A=  2  b  z  +y
Proceeding  in a parallel  fashion with the remaining  probabilities,
(A.  6)  q=  e(  1 _1  )
(A.7)  £2  =  L{Y  (bE  b  t )]
(A 8)  f3  =  2  _re  I  +  b
(A.9)  q3  =  2  +1-K+
(A.10) q4 =  2  [e(K-1)-y*  +c]
(A.11)  £4  =  [c  +  y* + re  (1-K)]
45Substituting  these expressions  into equation (10)  and manipulating,  one obtains  the
following quadratic equation in i.
(A.12)
(eYFbE(  1  1  ~(Ki )2~'  1  2bL  (1'~Y
2-  +K-1++--+  I1-K+-II  1-1  -- I 1 I
~'(1+bE)  (-bE  -21+  2  )  bE  bL +-  bL)(1+bL)Y  2  bL)J  )j
ICe  Jc  +  bE6  2  y*c=  0
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If bE  > bL , a similar analysis  can be performed. In this case,  though, the probabilities  q
attached  to the inflation outcomes  in equation (10)  are reversed:
q=  p{  >  y+  Y,  q2 =  P-  b<  +  y  <]<  ,  ,.e
q3=  P{  e  + Y*  >>  (1-K)ffe  + y*], and q 4 =  pr[s < (1_K)re + y*j. Substituting
these, and the corresponding  values  for k'i,  into equation (10)  and solving,  yields  the
following  expression  for expected  inflation when the Executive  is more inflation tolerant
than the Legislature:
(A.13)
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46Annex 3: Derivation of expected inflation under checks and balances with  an
independent central bank
From equation (13), for bE < bL , expected inflation is given by
e  VbE(fCB  -~~*  2bE(CB  - 2 + Y*)  l
LCB  =  q  I+bE  I  +  12bb  -CB  +
e  A  I  bE  bFbE(  CB  4A  *
q,  2(;rCB  '3  +  y  _  _-  L  +  +  q
4 E  b
1bE  1bL  +q  1  +bE
If they override the central bank's proposal after the shock is revealed and the private actors
have set expected inflation, the political actors make their determination  of a new inflation
policy exactly as if there were no central bank. The probabilities q; and the expected shocks
A
1i are calculated over the same limits as in the corresponding case in Annex 2 (bE < bL),
with no central bank.
As in Annex 2, substituting the expressions for the probabilities and expected shocks
into equation (13) and manipulating, we obtain the following expression for expected
inflation under central bank independence and checks and balances:
(A.14)  E  _1  1  (K  _1)2  ,y  E+2b(  i  i  )( 1 1  i(1  i y)
(  CB)  i1+  bE  2bEK  29 )+bE  tbE  bL )(  2bE  bL )bE  bL
+(1-K+  1  2bE  2bL  1  (l-K-  1  Y  +1+  r  2C bL  1  +  bE  1 +bL)  2L  bL)jrBL±b  I
+  bE  (2  *)=O.
1  +  bE  C
Since the central bank conditions its policy choice on the preferences of the most
inflation-averse political decision maker, the case where  bE  >  bL  changes the payoffs that
generated A. 14. In particular, instead of choosing policies such that the Executive is just
47indifferent  between  what the central  bank proposes  and what would prevail if the central
bank decision  were overridden and the checks  and balances  outcome (7CH)  prevailed,
z  = 2irE - AzCH,  the central bank instead  proposes z  =  2.r-  such that the Legislature
is just indifferent.  Expected inflation is therefore the solution to
ff (; 8 +qbL  bE  )(C  A+)]+q 2[bL  (zCB  £2  +  Y*)
L+l1  +  bL  1  +bE  CB  4  1+bL  CB
e+[(  2bL  bE  e  A
The probabilities qi and the expected shocks £i are calculated over the same limits as in the
corresponding case (bE > bL )in Annex 2.  Solving, we get the following solution for
expected inflation:
~~A15~  1+bL  1  +bE  'bE  2bE2  2  I+ bL (bL  bE  2bEb (A15 (rCBYK  2bL  _  bE  __  1+  i  +1-K_(1K)  )+  2bL(  _  )(+  (  +  )
- + +K 1  -- ]K12b1  +2  ( Lb_  bE  Q1  + r  2bL  bE  2
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